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Introduction	  The	  U.S.	  housing	  market	  crash	   in	  2007-­‐2008	  was	  not	  caused	  overnight	  by	  an	  over-­‐supply	  of	  new	  homes	   that	   could	   not	   be	   sold.	   It	  was	   caused	   by	   the	   new	  money	   flows	   into	  mortgages	   ever	   since	  1998.	  What	  changed	  in	  1998	  was	  that	  mortgage	  funds	  were	  not	  only	  used	  for	  building	  new	  homes	  at	  a	  price	  in	  line	  with	  CPI	  inflation,	  but	  the	  volume	  of	  such	  funds	  injected	  allowed	  the	  housing	  stock	  to	   appreciate	   in	   price	   over	   and	   above	   the	   CPI	   inflation	   level.	   	   In	   1998	   still	   only	   16.3%	   of	   funds	  provided	  were	  used	  to	  increase	  the	  housing	  stock	  prices	  over	  CPI	  inflation,	  while	  83.7%	  was	  used	  to	  build	  new	  homes.	  By	  2004	  and	  2006	  the	  percentage	  allocated	  to	  housing	  stock	  prices	  had	  grown	  to	  68%	  of	  all	  new	  mortgage	  funds	  injected	  in	  the	  housing	  market.	  	  Such	  poor	  allocation	  of	  funds	  had	  two	  effects.	  It	  lowered	  the	  efficiency	  of	  money	  used	  as	  economic	  growth	  only	  occurs	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  economic	  activities:	  the	  building	  of	  new	  homes.	  Secondly	  for	  those	  households	  that	  needed	  to	  borrow	  funds	  to	  enter	  the	  housing	  market,	  the	  inflated	  house	  prices	  required	  a	  higher	  and	  higher	  percentage	  of	  incomes	  to	  be	  allocated	  for	  an	  acquisition,	  leaving	  less	  disposable	   income	  for	  other	  consumption.	  Median	   incomes	  generally	  only	  grow	  at	  or	  slightly	  above	  CPI	  levels.	  	  Banks,	  Fannie	  Mae	  and	  Freddy	  Mac	  showed	  no	  restraint	   in	  volume	  control,	  while	  the	   fragmented	  banking	   supervision	   authorities	   also	   did	   not	   see	   the	   need	   to	   interfere	   to	  manage	   the	   volume	   of	  lending.	  No	  single	  individual	  household	  could	  possibly	  control	  the	  volume	  of	  such	  lending.	  	  In	   2007	   the	   bubble	   burst	   when	   the	   liquidity	   for	   mortgage-­‐backed	   securities	   dried	   up.	   The	  consequences	  were	  dramatic.	  Overfunding	   turned	   into	  underfunding.	  Over	   the	  period	  2006-­‐2013	  22.1	  million	   households	   faced	   foreclosure	   proceedings	   over	   their	   home	   loans.	   This	   equals	  more	  than	  one	  out	  of	  every	  six	  U.S.	  households.	  5.8	  million	  homes	  were	  repossessed,	  affecting	  one	  out	  of	  every	  8-­‐mortgage	  holder.	  Over	  the	  period	  January	  2008-­‐	  October	  2009	  7.8	  million	  Americans	  lost	  their	  jobs.	  In	  2013	  the	  real	  median	  household	  income	  was	  8%	  lower	  than	  the	  2007	  pre-­‐recession	  level	   of	   $56,435.	   Notwithstanding	   the	   lowering	   of	   interest	   rates	   to	   historically	   its	   lowest	   level,	  individual	  households	  reduced	  their	  mortgage	  portfolio	  by	  $1.2	  trillion	  over	  the	  period	  2008-­‐third	  quarter	   2014.	   The	   U.S.	   government	   (Federal,	   State	   and	   local)	   saw	   its	   tax	   revenues	   drop	   by	   $1.5	  trillion	  or	  29%	  over	  the	  period	  2007-­‐2009.	  	  The	   main	   action	   of	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	   apart	   from	   lowering	   interest	   rates	   was	   its	   program	   of	  Quantitative	  Easing.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  2014	  it	  had	  $2.461	  trillion	  of	  U.S.	  government	  debt	  on	  its	  books	  and	  another	  $1.737	  trillion	  in	  mortgage	  bonds.	  	  Prevention	   through	   volume	   control	   measures	   on	   the	   lending	   side	   would	   have	   been	   the	   most	  effective	  method	  to	  avoid	  the	  recession	  and	  all	  its	  consequences.	  However	  this	  did	  not	  happen.	  The	  experience	  of	  lower	  interest	  rates	  combined	  with	  QE	  can	  only	  be	  described	  as	  having	  a	  very	  slow	  impact.	   The	   reason	  was	   and	   is	   that	   individual	   households	  were	  hit	  where	   it	   hurts	  most:	   in	   their	  disposable	  income	  levels.	  A	  different	  type	  of	  QE	  could	  have	  been	  applied,	  which	  directly	  would	  have	  addressed	  such	  income	  levels.	   It	   is	  based	  on	  paying	  out	  a	  fixed	  amount	  per	  household	  by	  the	  Fed	  over	  a	  period	  of	  two	  to	  three	  years	  and	  repayment	  would	  be	  made	  out	  of	  future	  tax	  revenues	  over	  a	  ten	  year	  period.	  In	  this	  paper	  this	  method	  has	  been	  called:	  the	  Economic	  Growth	  Incentive	  Method	  (EGIM).	   The	   poorer	   households	   would	   have	   benefitted	   the	   most	   from	   such	   measure.	   QE	   in	   its	  current	  form	  has	  benefitted	  the	  banks	  and	  the	  wealthier	  individual	  households.	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  borrowing	  and	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  of	  Quantitative	  Easing©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  
1.	  Setting	  the	  scene	  
	  Incomes	  can	  be	  used	  for	  spending	  on	  consumer	  goods	  and	  services	  or	  for	  adding	  to	  the	  level	  of	  savings.	  	  	  	  Savings	   can	   be	   transferred	   to	   a	   government	   to	   spend	  more	   than	   their	   revenues	   level.	   Individual	  	  	  households	  can	  borrow	  to	  buy	  more	  goods	  and	  services	  than	  their	  income	  levels	  would	  allow	  them.	  	  Government	  debt	  turns	  into	  a	  financial	  asset	  for	  the	  holders	  of	  such	  debt.	  For	  individual	  households	  the	   debt	   conversion	   can	   take	   two	   distinctly	   different	   forms:	   the	   first	   one	   is	   a	   straightforward	  acquisition	  of	  a	   consumer	  good	  or	   service	  and	   the	  second	  one	   is	   the	  conversion	   into	  a	   fixed	  asset,	  usually	  a	  home.	  It	  is	  the	  latter	  type	  of	  conversion,	  which	  can	  cause	  the	  negative	  effects	  on	  economic	  growth.	  	  	  	  	  	  Population	   growth,	   the	   average	   family	   size	   or	   the	   changes	   therein	   and	   the	   changes	   in	   customer	  preferences	   are	   the	   main	   determinants	   in	   the	   need	   for	   new	   housing	   starts.	   When	   these	   three	  variables	   are	   assessed,	   the	  need	   (potential	   demand)	   for	  new	  homes	   is	  quite	   fixed.	   For	   the	  U.S,	   for	  instance,	   the	  need	   is	   for	  about	  1.8	  million	  new	  homes	  a	  year.	  The	  money	  supplied	   to	   satisfy	   these	  needs	   –mainly	   the	   annual	   incremental	  mortgage	   amounts-­‐	   did	   not	   follow	   the	   fixed	   need	   for	   new	  homes.	   From	   1998	   to	   2006	   the	   level	   of	   home	   mortgages	   granted	   far	   exceeded	   the	   costs	   of	   new	  homes.	   This	   drove	   up	   house	   prices	   leading	   to	   asset	   price	   inflation.	   Median	   income	   levels	   usually	  grow	  in	  line	  with	  the	  CPI	  inflation	  or	  slightly	  above	  such	  level.	  	  Over	  the	  whole	  period	  1998-­‐2007	  the	  increase	   in	  new	  mortgages	   funding	  amounted	   to	  $6.858	   trillion.	  New	  housing	  starts	  accounted	   for	  42%	  of	   the	  money	  used	  and	  asset	  price	   inflation	  over	  the	  CPI	   level	   for	  58%	  or	  $3.979	  trillion.	  The	  effect	  of	  such	  asset	  price	  inflation	  over	  and	  above	  the	  CPI	  level	  is	  that	  such	  a	  debt	  increase	  no	  longer	  creates	   economic	   growth.	   The	   U.S.	   case,	   as	   illustrated	   in	   this	   paper,	   shows	   that	   such	   pattern	   can	  continue	  for	  quite	  a	  few	  years	  before	  the	  bubble	  bursts.	  When	  it	  does,	  the	  asset	  price	  inflation	  will	  turn	   into	   a	   deflationary	   pattern	   with	   all	   the	   consequences	   on	   outstanding	  mortgage	   debt	   and	   on	  income	  levels.	  	  	  	  An	   early	   recognition	   of	   the	   symptoms	   of	   such	   a	   spiral	   movement	   is	   important.	   Banks	   (including	  Fannie	  Mae	  and	  Freddy	  Mac)	  did	  not	  stop	   lending,	  when	  they	  were	  overfunding	   the	  U.S.	  mortgage	  markets.	  Secondly	  the	  corrective	  action	  taken	  by	  the	  Fed	  after	  the	  bubble	  had	  busted,	  especially	  its	  action	  on	  Quantitative	  Easing,	  did	  help	  the	  owners	  of	  government	  and	  mortgage	  debt.	  However	  QE	  did	  not	  help	   individual	  households	  who,	   through	  no	   fault	  of	   their	  own,	  were	  exposed	  to	   far	  higher	  mortgage	   debt	   levels	   than	  was	   necessary	   to	   achieve	   the	   annual	   target	   of	   1.8	  million	   new	   homes.	  Rapid	   rises	   in	   unemployment	   and	   strong	   pressure	   by	   the	   lenders	   to	   either	   pay	   up	   or	   sell	   the	  mortgaged	  home	   severely	   reduced	   the	  disposable	   incomes	   levels.	   The	  U.S.	   government’s	   revenues	  level	   also	   dropped	   substantially.	   The	   reaction	   by	   individual	   households	  was	   to	   start	   saving	  more,	  notwithstanding	   that	  such	  saving	   further	  reduced	  disposable	   incomes.	  This	  savings	   trend	  also	  was	  contrary	  to	  the	  expectation	  that	  lower	  interest	  rates	  induce	  more	  borrowings.	  	  	  	  The	  management	  of	  the	  collective	  mortgage	  borrowing	  volumes	  can	  never	  be	  the	  responsibility	  of	  an	  individual	  household.	  However	  many	  households	  around	  the	  world	  have	  felt	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  management.	  The	  effects	  of	  overfunding	  of	   the	  U.S.	  mortgage	  borrowing	  market	  could	  have	  been	   undone	   most	   effectively	   by	   temporarily	   overfunding	   the	   U.S	   individual	   households’	   income	  levels.	  	  A	  different	  type	  of	  QE	  could	  have	  been	  used.	  How	  this	  could	  be	  done	  is	  set	  out	  in	  this	  paper.	  	  	  	  The	  ECB	  is	  at	  the	  start	  of	  another	  QE	  exercise.	  Perhaps	  the	  lessons	  from	  the	  U.S.	  experience	  may	  show	  that	  initiating	  separate	  actions	  for	  a	  government	  and	  for	  individual	  households	  work	  faster	  costs	  less	  and	  restores	  desired	  economic	  growth	  levels	  quicker.	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2.	  The	  U.S.	  experience1	  	  
2.1	  The	  money	  input-­‐new	  housing	  starts	  output	  relationship	  
	  1997	   has	   been	   chosen	   as	   the	   base	   year	   as	   in	   this	   year	   the	   increase	   in	   the	  mortgage	  amounts	  outstanding	  was	  $180	  billion2,	   the	  new	  housing	  starts	  per	  1	   July	  of	   the	  same	  year	   on	   an	   annualized	   basis	   were	   1.437	   million3,	   the	   median	   U.S.	   house	   price	   was	  $145,900	  in	  July	  19974	  and	  the	  amount	  allocated	  to	  each	  individual	  new	  housing	  start	  was	  $125,260.	  The	  latter	  amount	  was	  determined	  by	  dividing	  the	  increase	  in	  mortgage	  amounts	  outstanding	  by	  the	  new	  housing	  starts	  in	  the	  same	  year.	  The	  median	  U.S.	  house	  price	   rose	   to	   $149,900	   in	   July	   1998	   and	   the	   amounts	   spend	   per	   new	   home	   rose	   to	  $177,270.	  1998	  was	  the	  turn	  around	  year.	  	  Table	  1	   sets	  out	   the	  money	   input	   into	   the	  new	  housing	  starts	  and	   the	  average	  output	  price	  of	  the	  new	  homes	  for	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2008.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Table	  1:	  Money	  input	  –	  new	  housing	  output	  and	  average	  money	  allocated	  per	  new	  
home	  built	  over	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2008	  in	  the	  U.S.	  
	  Year	  	   Increase	  in	  mortgage	  amounts	  x	  	  U.S.$	  billlion	  
Housing	  starts	  per	  1	  July	  on	  annualized	  basis	  x	  million	  
U.S.$	  allocated	  	  for	  each	  new	  home	  1997	   	  	  	  180	   1.437	   125,260	  1998	   	  	  	  301	   1.698	   177,270	  1999	   	  	  	  377	   1.699	   221,900	  2000	   	  	  	  382	   1.463	   261,110	  2001	   	  	  	  509	   1.670	   304,790	  2002	   	  	  	  706	   1.655	   426,590	  2003	   	  	  	  881	   1.897	   464,420	  2004	   	  	  	  950	   2.002	   474,525	  2005	   1,053	   2.054	   512,660	  2006	   	  	  	  998	   1.737	   574,550	  2007	   	  	  	  701	   1.354	   517,730	  2008	   -­‐	  	  	  	  32	   	  	  .923	   	  	  In	  table	  2,	  in	  an	  alternative	  approach,	  the	  question	  has	  been	  answered	  how	  many	  new	  homes	   could	   have	   been	   started	   if	   U.S.	   home	   prices	   had	   increased	   in	   line	   with	   the	  Consumer	  Price	  Inflation	  Index	  (CPI).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A	  Keynesian	  factor	  in	  monetary	  policy:	  the	  Economic	  Growth	  Incentive	  Method	  by	  Drs	  	  	  	  	  	  Kees	  De	  Koning,	  5th	  January	  2015,	  http://mpra.ub.uni-­‐muenchen.de/61129/	  2	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/accessible/b100.htm	  3	  https://www.census.gov/construction/pdf/bpsa.pdf	  4	  http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/MSPNHSUS	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Table	  2:	  Potential	  Housing	  starts	  based	  on	  CPI	  basis	  	  Year	  	   Increase	   in	  mortgage	  amounts	  x	  U.S.$	  billion	  
Housing	  starts	  per	  1	  July	  on	  annualized	  basis	   x	  million	  
Annual	  CPI	  Inflation	  	  %	  
Median	  house	  prices	  	  per	  1	  July	  based	  on	  CPI	  x	  U.S.$	  
Potential	   housing	  starts	  based	  	  on	  CPI	  x	  million	  
1997	   	  	  	  180	   1.437	   	   145,900	   1.437	  1998	   	  	  	  301	   1.698	   1.6	   148,234	   2.031	  1999	   	  	  	  377	   1.699	   2.2	   151,495	   2.489	  2000	   	  	  	  382	   1.463	   3.4	   156,645	   2.439	  2001	   	  	  	  509	   1.670	   2.8	   161,031	   3.161	  2002	   	  	  	  706	   1.655	   1.6	   163,607	   4.315	  2003	   	  	  	  881	   1.897	   2.3	   167,370	   5.264	  2004	   	  	  	  950	   2.002	   2.7	   171,889	   5.527	  2005	   1,053	   2.054	   3.4	   177,733	   5.925	  2006	   	  	  	  998	   1.737	   3.2	   183,420	   5.441	  2007	   	  	  	  701	   1.354	   2.9	   188,739	   3.714	  2008	   -­‐	  	  	  	  32	   	  	  .923	   3.8	   195,911	   negative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Table	   1	   illustrates	   that	   the	   new	   money	   input	   into	   the	   housing	   market	   does	   not	  necessarily	  stimulate	  new	  homes	  being	  built.	  Over	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2005	  money	  flows	  used	  by	  individual	  households	  to	  acquire	  homes	  show	  that	  higher	  and	  higher	  amounts	  of	  money	  were	   needed	   per	   each	   newly	   built	   home.	   Economic	   growth	   only	   occurs	   by	  building	  more	  homes	  and	  not	  by	  increasing	  the	  price	  of	  the	  total	  stock	  of	  homes	  far	  in	  excess	  of	  income	  developments.	  	  Another	  way	  of	  expressing	  the	  development	  of	  the	  inefficient	  use	  of	  money	  in	  the	  home	  mortgage	   market	   in	   the	   U.S.	   over	   the	   period	   1997-­‐2007	   is	   to	   calculate	   the	   Money	  Efficiency	   Index	   (MEI).	   This	   index	   is	   calculated	   by	   comparing	   the	   actual	   number	   of	  housing	  starts	  per	  annum	  with	   the	  potential	  number	  of	  housing	  starts.	  The	   latter	  was	  based	   on	   the	   CPI	   index	   plus	   the	   money	   input	   into	   the	   new	   housing	   starts.	   Table	   3	  provides	  the	  results.	  
Table	  3	  Money	  Efficiency	  Index	  
	  Year	  	   Money	  Efficiency	  Index	  	   Year	   Money	  Efficiency	  Index	  	  1997	   100	   2003	   36.0	  1998	   	  83.6	   2004	   36.2	  1999	   	  68.3	   2005	   34.7	  2000	   	  60.0	   2006	   31.9	  2001	   	  52.8	   2007	   36.5	  2002	   	  38.4	   	   	  
	   7	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Table	   4:	   Mortgage	   fund	   allocation	   over	   new	   home	   starts	   and	   changes	   in	   the	  
housing	  stock	  valuation	  above	  the	  CPI	  inflation	  level	  over	  the	  period	  1998-­‐2007	  	  
	  
	  Year	   Increase	   in	  outstanding	  mortgage	  amounts	  X	  U.S.	  billion	  
Funds	  used	  for	  new	  home	  starts	  at	  CPI	  index	  level	  X	  U.S.	  billion	  
Funds	  used	  for	  Home	  asset	  price	  	  Inflation	   above	   CPI	  level	  X	  U.S.	  billion	  	  	  1998	   	  	  301	   	  	  252	   	  	  	  49	  1999	   	  	  377	   	  	  257	   	  	  120	  2000	   	  	  382	   	  	  229	   	  	  153	  2001	   	  	  509	   	  	  269	   	  	  240	  2002	   	  	  706	   	  	  271	   	  	  435	  2003	   	  	  881	   	  	  317	   	  	  564	  2004	   	  	  950	   	  	  344	   	  	  606	  2005	   1,053	   	  	  365	   	  	  688	  2006	   	  	  998	   	  	  319	   	  	  679	  2007	   	  	  701	   	  	  256	   	  	  445	  Total	  amounts	   6,858	  	  	  (100%)	   2,879	  	  	  (42%)	   3,979	  	  	  	  (58%)	  
	  
	  Table	   4	   illustrates	   the	   growing	   importance	   of	   the	   funding	   element	   that	   does	   not	  contribute	   to	   economic	   growth:	   funds	   allocated	   to	   increase	   the	   housing	   stock	   values	  over	  and	  above	  the	  CPI	  inflation	  level.	  The	  1998-­‐2007	  average	  percentage	  was	  58%,	  but	  on	  an	  annual	  basis	  the	  peaks	  were	  reached	  in	  2004	  and	  2006	  at	  68%.	  
	  Of	  each	  new	  mortgage	  granted	  over	  the	  period	  1998-­‐2007,	  on	  average	  58%	  was	  used	  to	  increase	   house	   prices	   above	   CPI	   inflation	   levels.	   	   These	   borrowings	   burdened	   new	  mortgagees	  unnecessarily	  with	  excessive	  mortgage	  amounts.	  
	  The	  analysis	  of	  the	  above	  data	  may	  lead	  to	  the	  following	  conclusions:	  	  1.	  The	  need	  for	  new	  homes	  is	  based	  upon	  population	  growth,	  changes	  in	  family	  size	  and	  changes	  in	  preferences	  for	  different	  types	  of	  homes.	  In	  the	  short	  term	  such	  need	  rarely	  changes	  rapidly.	  In	  the	  U.S.	  the	  need	  is	  for	  about	  1.8	  million	  new	  homes	  a	  year.	  	  2.	   Home	   acquisitions	   are	   financed	   with	   own	   savings,	   often	   complemented	   with	  borrowed	  funds.	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  The	  evil	  force	  of	  borrowing	  and	  the	  weakness	  of	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  Easing©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  3.	   The	   volume	   of	   newly	   borrowed	   funds	   for	   home	   acquisitions	   can	   have	   two	   very	  dissimilar	  effects:	  a	  volume	  effect	  on	  the	  number	  of	  new	  homes	  build	  and	  a	  price	  effect	  on	  the	  total	  housing	  stock.	  If,	  like	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  price	  effect	  starts	  dominating	  then	  new	  borrowings	   add	   less	   and	   less	   to	   economic	   growth	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   new	  mortgagees	   are	   burdened	  with	  mortgage	   levels	   that	   offer	   less	   value	   for	  money.	   Less	  value	  for	  money	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  percentage	  of	  an	  income	  that	  has	  to	  be	  allocated	  for	  repaying	  the	  mortgage.	  	  4.	  The	  individual	  households	  that	  suffer	  most	  from	  the	  declining	  values	  of	   income,	  are	  the	  new	  entrants	   to	   the	  housing	  market:	   the	  young	  and	  the	   lower	   income	  classes	   that	  have	  to	  borrow	  more	  percentage	  wise	  of	  their	  incomes	  than	  the	  more	  wealthy	  families.	  	  5.	  When	  house	  prices	  start	  dropping,	  the	  households	  with	  the	  highest	  borrowing	  levels	  -­‐again	   the	  young	  and	   the	  new	  entrants	   to	   the	  mortgage	  market-­‐	   suffer	   the	  most.	  They	  suffer	  in	  two	  ways:	  firstly	  from	  the	  depreciation	  in	  home	  values	  and	  secondly	  from	  the	  loss	  in	  income	  earning	  opportunities	  through	  unemployment	  and	  wage	  increases	  below	  CPI	   inflation	   levels.	   Over	   the	   period	   2006-­‐2009	   the	   values	   of	   households	   owner	  occupied	  real	  estate	  at	  market	  prices	  dropped	  by	  $5.57	  trillion.	  During	  the	  period	  1998-­‐2007	  the	  effects	  of	  overfunding	  the	  mortgage	  market	  by	  nearly	  $4	  trillion	  led	  to	  a	  loss	  of	  about	  $5.6	  trillion	  in	  home	  values	  in	  the	  three	  subsequent	  years.	  Between	  January	  2008	  and	   October	   2009	   7.8	   million	   Americans	   lost	   their	   jobs.	   In	   2013	   the	   real	   median	  household	  income	  was	  8%	  lower	  than	  the	  2007	  pre-­‐recession	  level	  of	  $56,435.	  5	  
	  
2.2	  Money	  input	  into	  the	  U.S.	  Federal	  Government	  and	  economic	  output	  	  In	   table	   5	   the	   economic	   impact	   on	   GDP	   is	   measured	   from	   Federal	   government	  borrowings	  for	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2013.	  
Table	  5:	  U.S.	  Federal	  government	  borrowings	  for	  the	  period	  1997-­‐20136	  
	  Year	   U.S	  Federal	  Government	  borrowings	  x	  U.S.billion	  
Percentage	  of	  GDP	  %	   Year	   U.S.	  Federal	  Government	  Borrowings	  x	  U.S.billion	  	  
Percentage	  of	  GDP	  %	  1997	   	  	  	  	  	  21.89	   +0.25	   2006	   	  	  	  248.18	   +1.79	  1998	   	  	  -­‐	  	  69.27	  	   -­‐	  0.76	   2007	   	  	  	  160.71	   +1.11	  1999	   	  	  -­‐	  125.61	   -­‐	  1.30	   2008	   	  	  	  458.55	   +3.12	  2000	   	  	  -­‐	  236.24	   -­‐	  2.23	   2009	   	  	  1412.69	   +9.80	  2001	   	  	  -­‐	  128.23	   -­‐	  1.21	   2010	   	  	  1294.37	   +8.65	  2002	   	  	  	  	  	  157.75	   +1.44	   2011	   	  	  1299.54	   +8.37	  2003	   	  	  	  	  	  377.59	   +3.28	   2012	   	  	  1086.97	   +6.69	  2004	   	  	  	  	  	  412.73	   +3.36	   2013	   	  	  	  	  679.50	   +4.05	  2005	   	  	  	  	  	  318.35	   +2.43	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/MEHOINUSA672N/	  6	  http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/download_multi_year_1997_2013USb_16s2li101mcn_H0t	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  of	  borrowing	  and	  the	  weakness	  of	  Quantitative	  Easing©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  The	   really	   remarkable	   changes	   in	   the	  U.S.	   government	  deficit	   funding	  over	   the	  period	  1997-­‐2013	  was	  not	  that	  there	  was	  a	  surplus	  from	  1998-­‐2001,	  or	  a	  deficit	  due	  to	  military	  efforts	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  from	  2003,	  but	  the	  dramatic	  jump	  in	  deficit	  funding	  from	  2009	  onwards.	  	  	  The	   total	   level	   of	   revenues	   for	   the	   U.S.	   Federal,	   States	   and	   local	   governments	   were	  $5.170	  trillion	   in	   fiscal	  year	  2007.	  This	   level	  of	  revenues	  dropped	  to	  $4.667	  trillion	   in	  2008	   and	   a	   further	   drop	   to	   $3.665	   trillion	   in	   2009.	   No	   government	   can	   lower	   its	  expenditure	   level	  by	   just	  over	  $1.5	   trillion	  or	  29%	  in	   just	   two	  years;	  neither	  should	   it	  attempt	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  short	  run.	  	  U.S.	   government	   expenses,	   including	   those	   funded	   by	   borrowed	   funds,	   lose	   their	  contribution	   to	   economic	   growth	   in	   the	   year	   after	   the	   expenditure	   has	   taken	   place.	  However	  the	  impact	  of	  borrowed	  funds	  will	  set	  back	  the	  disposable	  income	  growth	  for	  individual	   households	   for	   many	   years	   in	   the	   future.	   Hence	   the	   need	   for	   balanced	  budgets	  or	  for	  other	  solutions	  which	  help	  to	  get	  an	  economy	  back	  to	  its	  feet.	  	  The	   experience	  of	   the	  U.S.	   shows	   that	   as	   a	   consequence	  of	   the	   individual	   households’	  financial	   crisis	   brought	   about	   by	   years	   of	   neglect	   of	   the	   “money	   input	   -­‐	   new	   housing	  starts	  output	  relationship”	  U.S.	  government	  revenues	  dropped	  by	  29%	  over	  the	  period	  2007-­‐2009.	  The	  real	   issue	  was	  and	   is	   that	  government	  revenues	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  lagging	   indicator	  of	  economic	  health.	  The	   leading	   issue	  was	  and	   is	   the	   financial	  health	  situation	  of	  individual	  households.	  	  
2.3	  Some	  further	  conclusions	  
	  The	   relentless	   efforts	   to	   sell	   more	   and	  more	  mortgages	   during	   the	   years	   1998-­‐2007	  were	  just	  like	  a	  car	  running	  out	  of	  control.	  Fannie	  Mae	  and	  Freddy	  Mac	  helped	  the	  banks	  to	   grow	   their	   mortgage	   business	   volumes	   rapidly.	   	   The	   extensive	   use	   of	   mortgage	  backed	   securities	   and	   credit	   default	   swaps	   made	   such	   business	   growth	   even	   easier.	  Banking	   supervision	   in	   the	   U.S.	   is	   a	   highly	   fragmented	   activity	   and	   shared	   between	  Federal	   and	  State	   agencies.	  No	  agency	  had	  over-­‐all	   control	  over	   the	  mortgage	  market	  volumes.	   The	   free	  market	   philosophy,	   prevalent	   in	   the	  U.S.	   for	  many	   businesses,	  was	  seen	  as	  appropriate	  for	  all	  businesses	  including	  the	  financial	  sector.	  	  Ever	   since	   2008,	   the	   financial	   damage	   done	   to	   individual	   households,	   to	   the	   U.S.	  government	   at	   all	   levels	   and	   even	   to	   the	   banks	   should	   make	   economists	   rethink	  whether	   a	   mortgage	   volume	   growth	   objective	   should	   be	   given	   the	   overriding	   policy	  emphasis.	  How	  can	  such	  volume	  growth	  target	  be	  achieved?	   	  The	  U.S.	  banking	  system	  prefers	  to	  compete	  for	  business	  and	  is	  supervised	  by	  a	  fragmented	  banking	  supervision	  system.	  The	  losses	  inflicted	  on	  all	  sectors	  of	  business	  and	  the	  government,	  but	  last	  but	  not	   least	  on	   individual	  households	  do	  make	   it	  necessary	   to	  act	   in	  a	  manner	   that	   such	  irresponsible	  volume	  growth	  in	  mortgage	  lending	  does	  not	  occur	  again.	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3	  The	  choice	  between	  institutions	  and	  individual	  households	  
	  
3.1	  The	  adjustment	  process	  
	  The	  U.S.	   government,	   the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  and	   the	   individual	  households	  played	  the	  key	  roles	  in	  the	  adjustment	  process.	  Banks	  and	  the	  financial	  markets	  were	  rescued	  and	  companies	  adjusted	  their	  operations	  in	  line	  with	  expected	  demand	  levels.	  	  
	  
3.1.1	  The	  adjustment	  process	  for	  individual	  households	  
	  Contrary	   to	  many	   opinions,	   the	   adjustment	   period	   for	   individual	   households	   did	   not	  start	   in	   2005	   or	   2006,	   but	   started	   already	   in	   1998.	   In	   1998	   41.5%	  more	  money	  was	  used	   for	   each	   new	   built	   home	   compared	   to	   1997	   (See	   Table	   1).	   Table	   2	   shows	   that	  41.3%	  more	  homes	  could	  have	  been	  built	  if	  median	  house	  prices	  would	  have	  moved	  in	  line	  with	  CPI	  inflation.	  The	  potential	  number	  of	  new	  homes,	  which	  could	  have	  been	  built	  in	   1998,	   would	   have	   been	   200,000	   more	   than	   required	   to	   meet	   annual	   long-­‐term	  demand	  of	  1.8	  million	  new	  homes.	  This	  process	  of	  overfunding	  the	  housing	  market	  led	  to	  undermining	   the	  capacity	   to	   repay	  outstanding	  mortgages	  and	  also	   led	   to	   lowering	  the	  economic	  growth	  potential.	  This	  overfunding	  and	  undermining	  process	  continued	  to	  2008.	  	  When	   mortgage	   payment	   obligations	   can	   no	   longer	   be	   maintained,	   individual	  households	  find	  themselves	  in	  the	  unenviable	  situation	  to	  face	  the	  lenders.	  The	  statistics	  indicate	  that	  from	  the	  total	  housing	  stock	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  43.4	  million	  homes	  are	  rented	  and	  individual	  households	  own	  79.5	  million	  homes.	  Of	  the	  79.5	  million	  homes	  owned,	  49.2	  million	  individual	  households	  have	  taken	  out	  a	  mortgage.	  The	  most	  shocking	  statistic	  is	  that	  over	  the	  period	  2006-­‐2013	  22.1	  million	  households	  in	  the	  U.S.	  did	  face	  foreclosure	  proceedings7	  and	   5.8	   million	   homes	   were	   repossessed.	   The	   22.1	   million	   constituted	  more	  than	  one	  out	  of	  every	  6	  households	  in	  the	  U.S.	  The	  5.8	  million	  repossessed	  homes	  affected	  nearly	  one	  out	  of	  every	  8-­‐mortgage	  holder.	  	  All	   that	   one	   can	   conclude	   out	   of	   this	   overfunding	   process	   is	   just	   how	   economically	  inefficient	  such	  mortgage	  funds	  have	  been	  used	  with	  the	  very	  sad	  results	  of	  dramatically	  increased	   unemployment	   levels,	   a	   wage	   level	   growth	   below	   CPI	   inflation	   levels	   for	   a	  number	  of	  years	  since	  2008	  and	  a	  priority	  allocation	  of	  households	  incomes	  to	  repaying	  outstanding	   mortgage	   debt	   at	   the	   detriment	   of	   buying	   other	   consumer	   goods	   and	  services.	  Over	  and	  above	  all	   this,	  during	   this	  process	  over	   the	   last	  7	  years,	  5.8	  million	  households	  lost	  all	  their	  savings	  in	  their	  homes.	  On	  top	  of	  this	  all,	  individual	  households	  reduced	   their	   collective	  home	  mortgage	  outstanding	   amount	  by	   $1.2	   trillion	   from	   the	  end	  of	  2008	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  third	  quarter	  20148;	  this	  represents	  an	  11.4%	  drop	  in	  the	  level	  of	  outstanding	  mortgage	  amounts.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  http://www.statisticbrain.com/home-­‐foreclosure-­‐statistics/	  8	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/accessible/b100.htm	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  The	  evil	  force	  of	  borrowing	  and	  the	  weakness	  of	  Quantitative	  Easing©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  this	  disastrous	  overfunding	  process	  and	  the	  subsequent	  efforts	  to	  get	   the	   outstanding	   amounts	   repaid,	   the	   U.S.	   government	   (Federal,	   State	   and	   local	  governments)	  saw	  their	  revenues	   flow	  drop	  by	  $2	  trillion	  over	  the	  period	  2007-­‐2009.	  Over	   the	   period	   2009-­‐2013	   U.S.	   government	   debt	   increased	   by	   at	   least	   $3.5	   trillion	  more	  than	  could	  have	  been	  expected	  if	  the	  home	  funding	  crisis	  had	  not	  taken	  place.	  This	  economically	   inefficient	   use	   of	   funds	   for	   the	   home	  mortgage	  market	   led	   to	   a	   further	  inefficient	   use	   of	   funds	   for	   the	   individual	   households	   through	   the	   exacerbated	   deficit	  funding	   of	   the	   U.S.	   government.	   All	   in	   all	   the	   real	   victims	   of	   the	   inefficient	   home	  mortgage	  funding	  process	  were	  the	  individual	  households.	  They	  were	  the	  direct	  victims	  in	   lost	   income	   and	   spending	   opportunities,	   in	   reduced	   earnings,	   in	   increased	  unemployment	  levels	  and	  in	  an	  accelerated	  government	  debt	  level.	  	  	  
3.1.2	  The	  adjustment	  process	  for	  the	  U.S.	  government	  
	  The	  U.S.	  government,	  like	  all	  other	  governments,	  has	  an	  ambition	  as	  to	  which	  services	  to	  provide	   to	   the	  general	  public.	  Priorities	  are	  decided	  by	   the	  Houses	  of	  Congress	   in	   the	  U.S.	   or	   parliaments	   elsewhere.	   There	   is	   often	   a	   fierce	   debate	   about	   which	   type	   of	  services	  should	  be	  included	  and	  which	  should	  be	  left	  to	  the	  private	  sector.	  The	  followers	  of	   John	   Maynard	   Keynes	   were	   of	   the	   opinion	   that	   government	   budgets	   were	   the	  appropriate	  tool	  to	  stimulate	  employment	  creation	  by	  incurring	  additional	  government	  deficit	  funding.	  	  When	  outstanding	  government	  debt	   levels	  were	  around	  30%	  of	  GDP,	   this	  would	  have	  made	  sense.	  However	  current	  government	  debt	   levels	  of	  many	  countries	   in	  the	  world,	  including	   the	  U.S.,	  are	  at	  80%	  of	  GDP	  or	  over.	   In	   the	  case	  of	   the	  U.S.	  government	  debt	  level	   (Federal,	   State	   and	   local)	   it	   is	   forecasted	   to	   reach	  $21.845	   trillion	   for	   fiscal	   year	  2015,	  well	  above	  the	  U.S.	  GDP	  level.	  	  Tables	  1-­‐5	  showed	  that	  the	  main	  increase	  in	  government	  deficit	  funding	  occurred	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  overfunding	  of	  the	  U.S.	  housing	  market	  and	  the	  subsequent	  efforts	  to	   claim	   back	   those	   funds	   from	   individual	   households.	   The	   U.S.	   government	   saw	   its	  revenues	   drop	   by	   29%	   over	   the	   period	   2007-­‐2009.	   The	   deficit	   funding	   maintained	  government	  programs,	  but	  did	  and	  could	  not	  help	   individual	  households	   to	  get	  out	  of	  their	  debt	  position.	  A	  Keynesian	  solution	  of	  additional	  government	  debt	  creation	  on	  top	  of	  this	  all	  would	  have	  incurred	  major	  economic	  risks.	  
	  
3.1.3	  The	  adjustment	  process	  chosen	  by	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  
	  
The Federal Reserve's response to the financial crisis and actions to foster maximum 
employment and price stability according to its own description.9 
 “The	  Federal	  Reserve	  responded	  aggressively	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2007.	  The	  reduction	  in	  the	  target	  federal	  funds	  rate	  from	  5-­‐1/4	  percent	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_crisisresponse.htm	  
	   13	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  evil	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  of	  borrowing	  and	  the	  weakness	  of	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  Easing©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  effectively	  zero	  was	  an	  extraordinarily	  rapid	  easing	  in	  the	  stance	  of	  monetary	  policy.	  In	  	  addition,	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  implemented	  a	  number	  of	  programs	  designed	  to	  support	  the	   liquidity	   of	   financial	   institutions	   and	   foster	   improved	   conditions	   in	   financial	  markets.	   These	   programs	   led	   to	   significant	   changes	   to	   the	   Federal	   Reserve's	   balance	  sheet.	  	  While	   many	   of	   the	   crisis-­‐related	   programs	   have	   expired	   or	   been	   closed,	   the	   Federal	  Reserve	  continues	  to	  take	  actions	  to	  fulfill	  its	  statutory	  objectives	  for	  monetary	  policy:	  maximum	   employment	   and	   price	   stability.	   Over	   recent	   years,	   many	   of	   these	   actions	  have	   involved	   substantial	   purchases	   of	   longer-­‐term	   securities	   aimed	   at	   putting	  downward	   pressure	   on	   longer-­‐term	   interest	   rates	   and	   easing	   overall	   financial	  conditions.	  	  The	   tools	   described	   in	   this	   section	   can	   be	   divided	   into	   three	   groups.	   The	   first	   set	   of	  tools,	  which	  are	  closely	   tied	   to	   the	  central	  bank's	   traditional	   role	  as	   the	   lender	  of	   last	  resort,	   involve	   the	   provision	   of	   short-­‐term	   liquidity	   to	   banks	   and	   other	   depository	  institutions	   and	   other	   financial	   institutions.	   The	   traditional	   discount	   window,	   Term	  Auction	   Facility	   (TAF),	   Primary	   Dealer	   Credit	   Facility	   (PDCF),	   and	   Term	   Securities	  Lending	  Facility	  (TSLF)	  fall	  into	  this	  category.	  Because	  bank-­‐funding	  markets	  are	  global	  in	   scope,	   the	  Federal	  Reserve	  also	  approved	  bilateral	   currency	  swap	  agreements	  with	  several	  foreign	  central	  banks.	  The	  swap	  arrangements	  assist	  these	  central	  banks	  in	  their	  provision	  of	  dollar	  liquidity	  to	  banks	  in	  their	  jurisdictions.	  	  A	   second	   set	   of	   tools	   involves	   the	   provision	   of	   liquidity	   directly	   to	   borrowers	   and	  investors	  in	  key	  credit	  markets.	  The	  Commercial	  Paper	  Funding	  Facility	  (CPFF),	  Asset-­‐Backed	  Commercial	  Paper	  Money	  Market	  Mutual	  Fund	  Liquidity	  Facility	  (AMLF),	  Money	  Market	  Investor	  Funding	  Facility	  (MMIFF),	  and	  the	  Term	  Asset-­‐Backed	  Securities	  Loan	  Facility	  (TALF)	  fall	  into	  this	  category.	  	  As	  a	  third	  set	  of	  instruments,	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  expanded	  its	  traditional	  tool	  of	  open	  market	  operations	  to	  support	  the	  functioning	  of	  credit	  markets,	  put	  downward	  pressure	  on	   longer-­‐term	   interest	   rates,	   and	   help	   to	   make	   broader	   financial	   conditions	   more	  accommodative	   through	   the	   purchase	   of	   longer-­‐term	   securities	   for	   the	   Federal	  Reserve's	   portfolio.	   For	   example,	   starting	   in	   September	   2012,	   the	   FOMC	   decided	   to	  increase	   policy	   accommodation	   by	   purchasing	   agency-­‐guaranteed	   mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	   (MBS)	   at	   a	   pace	   of	   $40	   billion	   per	   month	   in	   order	   to	   support	   a	   stronger	  economic	   recovery	   and	   to	   help	   ensure	   that	   inflation,	   over	   time,	   is	   at	   the	   rate	   most	  consistent	   with	   its	   dual	   mandate.	   In	   addition,	   starting	   in	   January	   2013,	   the	   Federal	  Reserve	  began	  purchasing	  longer-­‐term	  Treasury	  securities	  at	  a	  pace	  of	  $45	  billion	  per	  month.	   In	   December	   2013,	   the	   FOMC	   announced	   a	  modest	   reduction	   in	   the	  monthly	  pace	  of	  asset	  purchases	  and	  indicated	  it	  would	  likely	  reduce	  the	  pace	  of	  asset	  purchases	  in	   further	   measured	   steps	   at	   future	   meetings	   if	   incoming	   data	   pointed	   to	   continued	  improvement	   in	   labor	   market	   conditions	   and	   inflation	   moving	   back	   toward	   the	  Committee’s	  2	  percent	  longer-­‐run	  objective.”	  	  	  The	  above	  was	  a	  direct	  quotation	  of	  the	  Fed’s	  response	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2007	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  of	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  De	  Koning	  	  Some	  observations	  can	  be	  made	  about	  the	  Fed’s	  response.	  	  1.	   The	   first	   one	   is	   about	   the	   start	   of	   the	   crisis.	   As	   tables	   1	   and	   4	   show	   the	   crisis	   of	  overfunding	  the	  mortgage	  market	  started	   in	  1998	  and	  not	   in	  2007.	   In	  2007	  one	  could	  observe	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  home	  mortgage	  debt	  mountain	  built	  up	  since	  1998.	  	  2.	   House	   price	   inflation,	  which	   affects	   all	   newcomers	   to	   the	   housing	  market,	  was	   not	  regarded	  as	  relevant	  to	  the	  inflation	  objective	  of	  2%.	  	  Forcing	  individual	  households	  to	  spend	  a	  higher	  and	  higher	  percentage	  of	  their	  incomes	  on	  servicing	  mortgage	  debt	  has	  had	  a	  detrimental	  effect	  on	  overall	  economic	  growth	  levels.	  	  3.	  New	  housing	  starts	  do	  not	  reflect	  general	  supply	  and	  demand	  theories,	  as	  demand	  is	  a	  finite	  rather	  than	  an	  unlimited	  one.	  The	  U.S.	  needs	  about	  1.8	  million	  new	  housing	  starts	  a	  year.	  In	  1998	  the	  increase	  in	  mortgage	  amounts	  outstanding	  would	  already	  have	  made	  it	   possible,	   if	   house	   prices	   had	   moved	   up	   in	   line	   with	   CPI	   inflation	   levels,	   to	   build	  200,000	   homes	   more	   than	   needed.	   Overfunding,	   rather	   than	   underfunding,	   was	   the	  main	   cause	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   which	   started	   in	   1998.	   Over	   the	   years’	   1998-­‐2007	  increasing	  money	  flows	  into	  the	  housing	  market	  created	  less	  and	  less	  economic	  growth.	  The	  Money	  Efficiency	  Index	  showed	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  inefficiencies	  as	  did	  table	  4.	  	  4.	  Banks	   (including	  Fannie	  Mae	  and	  Freddy	  Mac)	   competing	   for	   customers	   in	  making	  funds	   available	   to	   the	   home	   mortgage	   markets	   do	   not	   take	   into	   account	   the	   macro-­‐economic	   effects	   of	   overfunding	   a	   housing	  market	  with	   a	   finite	   need	   for	   new	   homes.	  Competition	  among	  banks	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  limits	  on	  the	  volume	  of	  funds	  lend.	  	  5.	  The	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  interest	  rate	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  guide	  money	  to	  its	  best	  use	  should	  be	  called	   into	   question.	   The	   two	   main	   borrowing	   groups:	   a	   government	   and	   individual	  households	  do	  not	  behave	   like	  companies.	  For	  companies	   it	   is	  a	  cost	  among	  others	   to	  take	  into	  account	  when	  assessing	  profitable	  ventures.	  Companies	  also	  have	  a	  buffer	   in	  equity	   capital,	   which	   lowers	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   interest	   rate	   changes.	   Governments,	  generally	  speaking,	   take	  very	   little	  notice	  of	   interest	  rate	  changes	  as	   they	  assume	  that	  tax	  revenues	  will	  have	  to	  make	  up	  any	  shortfall;	   in	  other	  words	  the	  tax	  payers	  are	  the	  ultimate	  victims	  of	  any	  interest	  rate	  increase,	  while	  governments	  will	  easily	  find	  ways	  to	  spend	   tax	   revenues	  when	   interest	   rates	   drop.	  Why	  would	   it	   be	   sensible	   for	   a	   central	  bank	  to	  raise	  interest	  rates	  for	  slowing	  down	  house	  price	  inflation	  above	  the	  CPI	  level?	  There	   is	  a	  defined	  need	  for	  new	  homes	  and	  a	  defined	  need	  for	  borrowing	   levels.	  Both	  are	   not	   determined	   by	   markets	   but	   by	   population	   growth	   etc.	   If	   interest	   rates	   are	  increased	   to	   slow	   down	   lending	   for	   mortgages,	   such	   action	   will	   have	   undesirable	  consequences	  for	  both	  a	  government	  and	  companies.	  Neither	  of	  these	  two	  groups	  have	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  the	  lending	  volume	  for	  a	  single	  purpose:	  home	  acquisitions.	  	  6.	   The	   response	   to	   the	   aggressive	   lowering	   of	   the	   Fed	   funds	   rate	   from	   5	   -­‐1/4	  %	   to	  practically	   zero	   did	   not	   entice	   existing	   mortgage	   holders	   to	   borrow	   more	   or	   new	  entrants	   to	   enter	   the	   mortgage	   markets;	   rather	   the	   opposite.	   From	   the	   outstanding	  home	  mortgages	  level	  of	  $10.5	  trillion	  as	  per	  the	  end	  of	  2008,	  $1.2	  trillion	  was	  repaid	  on	  a	  net	  basis	  between	  2008	  and	  the	  third	  quarter	  of	  2014.	  Individual	  households	  saved	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  De	  Koning	  	  more	   out	   of	   their	   incomes	   to	   repay	   mortgages,	   thereby	   reducing	   economic	   growth	  levels.	  	  7.	   The	   one	   group	   most	   affected	   by	   the	   overfunding	   process	   were	   the	   individual	  households	   in	   the	  U.S.	  Of	  course	  some	  of	   the	   lending	   institutions	  and	   financial	  market	  participants	   would	   have	   gone	   bankrupt	   if	   no	   liquidity	   and	   financial	   market	   support	  would	  have	  been	   given.	  This	  would	  have	  been	   catastrophic	   for	   the	  U.S.	   as	  well	   as	   for	  other	  countries.	  However	  one	  should	  not	   forget	   that	   the	  banks	   (including	  Fannie	  Mae	  and	   Freddy	  Mac)	   were	   the	   ones	   responsible	   for	   all	   the	   lending	   decisions	   in	   the	   first	  place.	  No	  borrower	  can	  borrow	  unless	  the	  lender	  decides	  so.	  	  8.	   Last	   but	   not	   least	   one	   cannot	   deny	   that	   Quantitative	   Easing	   as	   an	   instrument	   of	  economic	  re-­‐adjustment	  has	  worked	  very	  slowly.	  Buying	  up	  past	  government	  debt	  titles	  and	  outstanding	  mortgage	  backed	  securities	  has	  helped	  banks	  to	  earn	  more	  income;	  it	  also	   helped	   hedge	   funds	   and	   the	   wealthier	   individual	   households	   with	   appreciating	  bond	  and	   share	  prices.	   It	   has	  helped	   to	   lower	   interest	   rates	   to	  historically	   the	   lowest	  levels	  for	  over	  forty	  years.	  This	  has	  hurt	  savers,	  including	  those	  saving	  for	  a	  pension	  pot.	  It	  also	  did	  not	  induce	  home	  mortgage	  borrowers	  to	  borrow	  more,	  rather	  to	  the	  contrary.	  As	  stated,	  between	  2008	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  3rdquarter	  2014	  borrowers	  reduced	  their	  outstanding	   by	   $1.2	   trillion.	   The	   key	   element	   missing	   in	   quantitative	   easing	   was	   to	  consider	  the	  financial	  position	  of	   individual	  households,	  not	   in	  a	  very	   indirect	  manner	  but	   in	   a	   direct	   way.	   Individual	   households	   were	   not	   responsible	   for	   the	   increase	   in	  outstanding	  mortgage	  volumes,	  especially	  in	  respect	  to	  the	  volume	  of	  funds	  allocated	  to	  pushing	  house	  prices	  up	   faster	   than	   the	  CPI	   index	   and	   income	  growth	  of	   households.	  The	  collective	  of	  banks	  plus	  Fannie	  Mae	  and	  Freddy	  Mac	  were.	  If	  households	  had	  been	  helped	   in	   their	   liquidity	   position	   from	   as	   early	   as	   from	   2008,	   the	   adjustment	   period	  would	  have	  been	   substantially	   shortened	   and	   economic	   growth	   rates	  would	  not	   have	  been	   dropped	   so	   drastically.	   The	   U.S.	   government	   would	   not	   have	   seen	   its	   revenues	  drop	  so	  severely.	  How	  the	  Economic	  Growth	  Incentive	  Method	  could	  have	  worked	  and	  still	  can	  work	  for	  European	  countries	  will	  be	  set	  out	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
	  
4.	  The	  Economic	  Growth	  Incentive	  Method	  (EGIM)	  	  The	  readjustment	  period	  for	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  has	  taken	  well	  over	  6	  years	  from	  the	  start	  of	  2008.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  home	  mortgage	  market	  crisis	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  2008,	  the	  whole	  economy	   was	   affected:	   companies,	   individual	   households	   and	   the	   Government’s	  finances.	  A	  finance-­‐induced	  crisis	  needs	  a	  finance-­‐induced	  answer.	  	  The	   Federal	   Reserve	   did	   save	   the	   banks,	   apart	   from	   one.	   It	   did	   save	   the	   financial	  markets	   from	   collapse.	   It	   did	   lower	   short	   and	   long-­‐term	   interest	   rates	   and	   it	   did	  monetize	  $2.461	  trillion	  of	  government	  debt	  and	  $1.737	  trillion	  in	  mortgage	  debt	  as	  per	  its	  balance	  sheet	  of	  31	  December	  2014.10	  	  	  The	  real	  question	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  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm	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  The	  evil	  force	  of	  borrowing	  and	  the	  weakness	  of	  Quantitative	  Easing©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  The	   key	   consideration	   could	   have	   been	   to	   shift	   the	   attention	   away	   from	   institutional	  support	   –support	   of	   the	   banks	   and	   the	   financial	   system-­‐	   to	   some	   form	   of	   support	   of	  individual	  households.	  More	  of	  the	  latter	  would	  have	  reduced	  the	  need	  for	  the	  former.	  	  In	   2007	   the	   average	   median	   household	   income	   was	   $50,740. 11 .	   The	   number	   of	  individual	  households	  was	  116	  783	  000.12	  If	  in	  2008,	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  had	  decided,	  with	  approval	  from	  the	  Houses	  of	  Congress,	  to	  advance	  tax	  free	  4%	  or	  $2030	  to	  every	  individual	  household,	  the	  total	  bill	  would	  have	  come	  to	  $237	  billion.	  If	  in	  2009	  3%	  had	  been	  advanced	  the	  bill	  would	  have	  been	  about	  $180	  billion	  and	  for	  2010	  2%	  with	  a	  bill	  of	  $130	  billion;	  in	  total	  $547	  billion.	  	  What	  would	  have	  happened	   is	   that	   for	   the	   lowest	   fifth	   income	  group	   this	  would	  have	  meant	  an	  income	  increase	  of	  11.47%	  over	  their	  average	  household	  income	  of	  $17,700.	  For	  the	  second	  fifth	  with	  an	  average	  income	  of	  $38,000	  it	  would	  have	  meant	  an	  income	  injection	  of	  5.34%.	  For	  the	  third	  fifth	  it	  meant	  an	  injection	  of	  3.67%	  over	  their	  median	  income	  of	  $55,300;	   for	   the	   fourth	   fifth	  a	  2.61%	  injection	  and	   for	   the	   top	   fifth	  a	  1.02%	  injection.	  	  The	  2008	  cash	  injection	  would	  have	  implied	  a	  1.61%	  growth	  incentive,	  as	  the	  GDP	  for	  the	   year	   was	   $14.72	   trillion.	   However	   the	   consumption	  multiplier	   would	   likely	   have	  made	  the	  result	  more	  significant.	  	  The	  claim	  that	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  would	  have	  had	  on	  its	  books	  would	  not	  be	  a	  claim	  on	  individual	  households,	   but	  on	   the	  whole	   economy,	   represented	  by	   future	   government	  revenues.	   Instead	   of	   spending	   a	   full	   $2.4	   trillion	   on	   past	   government	   debt	   through	  Quantitative	   Easing,	   about	   $550	   billion	   could	   have	   been	   spent	   on	   basis	   of	   future	  government	   cash-­‐in	   flows.	   In	   other	   words	   the	   Houses	   of	   Congress	   could	   have	  authorized	   that	   the	   Fed	   could	   reclaim	   the	   individual	   household	   cash	   injection	   from	  future	  government	  revenues	  over	  a	  period	  of	  say	  ten	  years.	  	  What	  is	   important	   in	  the	  EGIM	  method	  is	  that	   lower-­‐income	  families	  are	  helped	  much	  more	  percentage	  wise	  than	  the	  better	  off	  ones.	  This	  makes	  perfect	  economic	  sense,	  as	  the	   lower-­‐income	   families	   are	   the	   ones	   who	   generally	   suffer	   most	   from	   a	   recession	  period.	  	  Some	  of	   the	   cash	  provided	   to	   individual	  households	  would	  have	  been	  used	   to	   service	  outstanding	  mortgages.	  The	  result	  would	  have	  been	  fewer	  foreclosure	  proceedings	  and	  less	  home	  repossessions.	   It	  would	  also	  mean	  that	   the	  affected	  households	  would	  have	  more	   funds	   to	   spend	   on	   other	   goods	   and	   services.	   The	   households	   not	   affected	   by	  mortgage	   repayments	   would	   have	   more	   money	   to	   spend	   on	   goods	   and	   services.	   A	  campaign	   to	   encourage	   the	   population	   to	   use	   the	   funds	   for	   “economic	   stimulus”	  consumption	  should	  convince	  most	  households	  to	  follow	  suit.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/acs-­‐09.pdf	  12	  http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-­‐235.pdf	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  The	  evil	  force	  of	  borrowing	  and	  the	  weakness	  of	  Quantitative	  Easing©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  The	   above	   use	   of	   a	   4,	   3	   and	   2%	   was	   only	   to	   illustrate	   how	   an	   Economic	   Growth	  Incentive	  Method	   could	  work.	   If	   the	   EGIM	   system	  would	   be	   used,	   it	   is,	   of	   course,	   the	  prerogative	  of	  the	  legislature	  together	  with	  the	  Central	  bank	  to	  choose	  the	  appropriate	  level	  of	  cash	  advance	  for	  all	  individual	  households	  or	  for	  specific	  income	  categories.	  	  The	  United	  States	  have	  already	  gone	  through	  their	  adjustment	  period	  of	  6	  years	  since	  the	  start	  of	  2008.	  Europe	  and	  especially	  the	  Eurozone	  have	  not	  adjusted	  yet.	  The	  EGIM	  method	  is	  not	  only	  applicable	  to	  the	  U.S.	  for	  future	  use,	  but	  can	  be	  applied	  by	  the	  ECB	  for	  all	  Eurozone	  countries.	  One	  can	  describe	   the	  use	  of	   future	  Government	  cash	  revenues	  for	  current	  expenditure	  as	  a	  Keynesian	  application	  of	  monetary	  policy.	  	  Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  Chorleywood,	  U.K.	  7th	  February	  2015	  E-­‐mail:	  keesdekoning008@hotmail.com	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   18	  




• A	  Keynesian	  factor	   in	  monetary	  policy:	   the	  Economic	  Growth	  Incentive	  Method	  by	   Drs	   Kees	   De	   Koning;	   5th	   January	   2015;	   http://mpra.ub.uni-­‐muenchen.de/61229/	  	  
• Federal	  Reserve	  Bank,	  St.Louis,B100	  Balance	  Sheet	  of	  Households	  and	  Non-­‐profit	  Organizations,	  historical	  data	  	  
• U.S.	  Department	  of	  Housing	   and	  Urban	  Development	   and	  United	   States	  Census	  Bureau:	  Historical	  data	  new	  residential	  construction	  	  
• Federal	  Reserve	  Bank,	  St.	  Louis,	  Median	  House	  Price	  Series	  	  
• Federal	  Reserve	  Bank,	  St.	  Louis,	  Real	  Median	  Household	  Income	  levels	  	  
• U.S.	   Government	   spending	   website,	   multiyear	   1997-­‐2013	   U.S	   government	  borrowing	  data	  	  
• Statistic	  Brain	  website;	  home	  foreclosure	  statistics	  	  
• Federal	  Reserve:	  Balance	  sheet	  per	  31	  December	  2014	  	  
• Board	   of	   Governors	   of	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	   System;	   Credit	   and	   Liquidity	  Programs	  and	  the	  Balance	  Sheet	  –	  Crisis	  Response.	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